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HOW CHINA MIGHT INVADE TAIWAN
Piers M. Wood and Charles D. Ferguson

W

hile defense analysts agree that the Taiwan Strait remains a flashpoint
for armed conflict because of China’s near obsession with reunification
with Taiwan, these analysts generally fall into two camps regarding China’s ability to carry out a successful invasion against Taiwan, either today or in the foreseeable future.
One camp enumerates disproportionate numerical advantages in combat aircraft, soldiers, submarines, etc., that the People’s Republic of China enjoys over
Taiwan and also cites China’s acquisition of advanced Russian Sovremenny-class
destroyers, SS-N-22 Sunburn antiship cruise missiles, and Sukhoi-27 combat
aircraft. While stopping short of predicting an easy victory over Taiwan, these
analysts typically conclude that the United States must increase its military ties
1
with Taiwan. Other analysts envision a marked decrease in Taiwan’s military capabilities in mid-decade that could give China an edge by the end of the decade.
Some point out, however, that even massive U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan
would do little in the short term to enhance the island’s defenses, because of the
2
time it would take Taiwan’s military to absorb the new equipment.
The other camp, in contrast, recognizes Taiwan’s qualitative advantage in
combat aircraft and warships. Moreover, this group perceives the difficulties
inherent in an invasion of Taiwan and grasps the natural advantages possessed
3
by defending forces. Although these analysts acknowledge that Chinese modernization could someday prove decisive in a future invasion attempt, they usually place this development ten or twenty years hence.
The first school of thought is flawed by its reliance on more or less sophisticated “bean counts” that stop short of a full operational analysis. The second
camp, for its part, is playing by Western rules and perhaps forgets that twice in
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the last fifty years the United States has underestimated the determination of
Asian militaries, with severe consequences. Further, both groups generally
presume that an invasion would be an all-or-nothing proposition, positing that
an invasion must occur in one fell swoop (the “nothing” possibility including an
“escalating ladder” of threats meant to intimidate Taiwan into capitulation
without an invasion). By and large, they neglect, or do not probe in detail, a third
contingency—a phased military operation. Faced with operational realities,
military professionals most often think in terms of extended campaigns. However, in this case the staging aspect has been so seldom addressed recently that
few modern readers are even aware that the Peng Hu Islands (formerly the
Pescadores) sit astride the invasion routes across the Taiwan Strait—as hard to
ignore, tactically, as an ox in the living room.
As a contribution to the debate over whether or not China possesses the capability to invade Taiwan in the near term, this article assesses this missing factor
from a doctrinal perspective and finds that a phased invasion, one that ratchets
up the level of offensive operations, has a better prospect of success than an
all-out attack against the main island of Taiwan. While we make no predictions
about the success or failure of a Chinese invasion against Taiwan in the foreseeable future, we caution that a determined China could launch an invasion
sooner than the five, ten, or twenty years that some have projected, though it
would be unlikely to succeed if it made the attempt today.
PHASED INVASION
The People’s Liberation Army could realize a number of important advantages,
should it invade Taiwan, by conducting the operation in three phases: seizing
Quemoy (Kinmen) and other islands close to the mainland, capturing the Peng
Hu Islands, and assaulting Taiwan’s west coast. By attacking these objectives in
succession, the Chinese could amass great numerical superiority against each
one in turn and render the next object less defensible. This stepping-stone strategy would place the defenders in the predicament of deciding whether to absorb
casualties fighting for key terrain currently under attack or to conserve resources
for a final stand on the main island.
Phasing could work to the Chinese advantage for other reasons as well.
Beijing could exploit the initial phase domestically, creating a state of war fever
that would generate support for military construction projects that would in
turn be essential for succeeding phases but would seem unjustifiable in peacetime. Moreover, a break after the first two phases would allow an opportunity for
major upgrades in military training, taking advantage of experience gained in
what would amount to combat “rehearsals” for an assault against the main island. Long halts would keep the door open for a general surrender or a favorable
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negotiated settlement with Taiwan. Notably, the preliminary phases might also
be viewed as less than a full attack on the island, and thus as not justifying U.S.
military intervention.
For the People’s Liberation Army, an attack on Quemoy represents more an
opportunity than a risk. Although Quemoy is heavily fortified with tunnel and
bunker complexes, the Chinese would have little difficulty amassing five-to-one
odds against Quemoy’s fifty-five thousand defenders. Also, because of its proximity to the mainland and the shallow depth of the water between, an attack on
Quemoy would resemble less an amphibious invasion than a river crossing. Accordingly, the Chinese could safely presuppose one of the cardinal precepts of
amphibious doctrine, air superiority. That is, they could conduct the attack
under the umbrella of air defense forces—both on the mainland (long-range
surface-to-air missiles belonging to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force) and
missile and antiaircraft-artillery forces integral to the army assault units themselves. Keeping the Chinese air force largely out of this battle would preserve its
aircraft, while air defense forces could shoot down some of the Taiwanese air
force’s best aircraft—unless the Taiwanese held them back. Chinese antiair artillery would have two factors in its favor: huge numbers and concentration of firepower. The Chinese could employ about sixteen thousand air-defense artillery
tubes, compared to the four thousand guns that Iraq had in the Persian Gulf
War. Also, and again in contrast to DESERT STORM, this battle would take place in
a confined space—fifty miles of coastline and inland perhaps thirty-five miles.
The Peng Hu Islands, the secondphase objective, comprise a dozen or so
rocky islets in the Taiwan Strait, thirty
miles from Taiwan. Because the TaiCHINA
wanese forces (currently numbering
sixty thousand) on the Peng Hus could
threaten the flank of an assault against
the main island, the Chinese must take
these islands first in any case. By the
same token, however, once seized these
Quemoy
(Kinmen)
islands could prove useful in preparing
for the final invasion.
Peng Hu
(Pescadores)
The actual amphibious landings in the
Peng Hus would be on a much smaller
scale than the mammoth invasion of
the main island, but it would serve as a
test of China’s capability. Unlike the
first phase, without air superiority and
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at least some measure of sea control, any hope of victory in this phase, and accordingly in the overall campaign, would be lost. Absent those prerequisites, the
offensive forces might be obliged to abort the operation, making an assault on
Taiwan one of history’s nonevents—like Hitler’s invasion of England.
This is not to say that success requires a multistaged campaign. The point here
is that the time factor dramatically changes the operational parameters of a
cross-strait invasion—Taiwanese defenders are in much greater peril from a methodical campaign than from an abrupt, full-scale assault. So also, Beijing politicians may see strategic safety in such incrementalism.
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
A clear understanding of the essential requirements of any amphibious operation—whether or not conducted in phases—is necessary in determining
whether China could invade Taiwan. U.S. joint amphibious doctrine—which,
based upon historical experience, is the most authoritative source for any amphibious warfare—sets out four fundamental precepts for amphibious opera4
tions. The first is that air superiority must be achieved before embarkation of
troops and maintained throughout the assault and landing. Second, sea control—ideally, outright sea denial—is necessary to ensure freedom of movement
at sea and thereby protect troop transports and prevent naval counterattacks.
Third, carefully choreographed sea lift from embarkation to landing is vital for
the coherence of tactical units on the beach, and sea-lift capacity must be sufficient to give the ground assault a numerical advantage. Finally, the landing force
must achieve fire superiority on the beach before launching the assault. Fire support—naval gunfire, close air support, and field artillery—must be reliably and
quickly available.
Before examining these requirements in detail, we need to specify a set of reasonable assumptions to bound the analysis. The first is that China would not re5
sort to nuclear war. Further, we posit that China would not launch a “people’s
war” of insurgency. The third assumption is that the United States would not
militarily intervene before China actually attempted to establish an amphibious
beachhead on the island.
Air Superiority
Air superiority represents the most critical precept, because the other factors depend upon it. Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, we assume that China
would not proceed with an invasion unless it could achieve air superiority.
Virtually all practitioners of amphibious warfare have considered sea control and air
superiority to be prerequisites to landing. . . . The amphibious attacker has the initiative. If control of the sea and air is not gained at least in the immediate area of a
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landing, the attacker can postpone or cancel the landing. The defender has no such
option. The corollary, of course, is that a defender can usually deter a landing by
maintaining air and sea control.

6

Table 1 displays the quantitative advantage of China in fighter and attack air7
craft versus Taiwan. However, the Chinese air force and naval aviation are qualitatively outmatched. Only the Russian-made Su-27 long-range air-superiority
fighter and the Su-30 (a two-seat, multirole, long-range interceptor version of
the Su-27) come close to matching the most advanced Taiwanese aircraft.
TABLE 1
CHINESE/TAIWANESE EQUIVALENT FIGHTER/ATTACK AIRCRAFT
PRC
(fmr Russian
designation)

Low Est.

J-11 (Su-27)

48

65*

F-16

150

—(Su-30)**

–

40*

Mirage 2000

60

J-8

100

300*

IDF
(Ching-Kuo)

130

J-7 (MiG-21)

600

780*

F-5

200

J-6 (MiG-19)

1,750*

3,450

330*

600

0

400

Q-5
J-5 (MiG-17) and
J-4 (MiG-15)
Total

2,830†

High Est.

Taiwan

Inventory

5,635

540

*IISS figures (giving a total of 3,300).
**Su-30 MKK, “delivered but not in service,” hence no PRC designation.
†Defense Dept. unclassified total is 4,300 “tactical fighters.”

Nonetheless, before discounting the impact of the Chinese quantitative advantage, one should consider two crucial factors not properly emphasized in the
literature.8 First, China’s principal objective in the air war would be to attack airfields in order to reduce the sortie rate of defending aircraft, not to maximize
air-to-air kills. Second, China can build fields close enough to Taiwan to allow
even older aircraft to reach the island in large numbers. Presently, it can support
in revetments about 1,100 combat aircraft in the twenty-two airbases within 370
9
miles—that is, within striking distance—of Taiwan. In addition, there are perhaps two dozen more air facilities between 370 and five hundred miles from Taiwan. Their aircraft could defend the bases closer to the coast and replace aircraft
shot down.
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However, it would do the People’s Liberation Army Air Force little good to reduce the defenders’ sortie rate if China could not quickly “turn around” aircraft—that is, keep large numbers of its own aircraft over enemy airfields. The
Chinese sortie rate, in turn, would depend upon the capacity of close-in airfields. Clearly, China cannot achieve air superiority, and therefore cannot invade
Taiwan, until it builds new airfields near Taiwan or greatly expands existing
ones. By the same token, it might be imprudent to presume that China cannot
rapidly do so; airfield construction does not require advanced technologies. A
nationwide reallocation of resources would get the job done in a matter of
months, not years.
As for China’s ballistic missiles, certain crucial factors deserve emphasis. The
current inaccuracy of these missiles means that, at the current rate of buildup,
China will require several more years to produce missiles in sufficient numbers
10
to damage Taiwanese airfields significantly enough to retard their sortie rates.
However, the most important effect of preemptive missile strikes would be the
suppression of air defenses. Missiles would be especially effective for that purpose were the Chinese to incorporate cluster munitions, which would spread
11
thousands of bomblets over wide areas.
Sea Control
Air cover would not completely protect the movement and landing phases of the
invasion from the defending fleet. The Taiwanese navy has thirty-five principal
surface combatants, compared to fifty-three for China. Nonetheless, and despite
plans to acquire advanced destroyers from Russia, the Chinese navy is qualitatively outmatched in most categories of warships. Its surface combatants alone
could not protect the landing force in transit and secure the supply lines thereafter. China’s submarine force would be the key factor in offsetting the Taiwanese
navy’s impressive capabilities.
China’s seventy submarines—against Taiwan’s four submarines (two of the
World War II–vintage “Guppy” type)—could establish a corridor just before the
assault, in a form of sea denial uniquely suited to the confined Taiwan Strait.
Even Taiwan’s advanced antisubmarine warfare resources—including seven
frigates of the Cheng Kung (Oliver Hazard Perry) class, with antisubmarine heli12
copters—could not effectively oppose so many boats. Submarines guarding
both sides of the swept zone could deny passage to Taiwanese surface combatants with reasonable effectiveness; depending on the assault route, each submarine would be responsible for as small a sector as two to five miles.
On the other hand, because most of the strait is fairly shallow, Chinese submarines would have limited ability to hide. Some might operate on or near the
surface, losing much of their advantage. However, the southeasterly approach
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from China to Taiwan offers deeper waters and perhaps therefore a logical attack
corridor. Although using submarines to establish an attack corridor is a bit unorthodox, it could be a major mistake for Taiwan’s navy to ignore the possibility.
Sea Lift and Taiwan Strait Transit
Of the lengthy lists of combat tasks that would face the invaders, two critical
ones stand out: moving the requisite multitudes to the battlefield and, once on
the beach, achieving superiority at some point. Many analysts claim that both
are presently beyond China’s capabilities.
China has a large merchant fleet, with an enormous capacity for personnel and
cargo. Its fifty naval amphibious ships and between two hundred and 350 landing craft, however, would be utterly unable to carry the entire combined-arms
13
force. It would be logical to devote military amphibious vessels exclusively to
heavy weapons like tanks and artillery rather than personnel; in any case, bow
ramps are just about the only way to get this bulky hardware ashore in an assault.
If the amphibious ships were devoted entirely to tanks and the landing craft to
artillery, more than 250 tanks and almost seven hundred pieces could be put
14
ashore in one wave. This is not impressive for a landing force that could number over a hundred divisions—a single U.S. armored division has more tanks,
and the artillery would outfit only about ten U.S. divisions; still, specialized amphibious craft could rapidly shuttle tanks and artillery ashore. In any case, it has
always been difficult, for any nation, to get tanks and artillery ashore. That is
why heavy reliance upon infantry, naval gunfire, and close air support is a hallmark of amphibious operations everywhere.
Meanwhile, the Chinese merchant fleet could be transporting upward of two
million troops, in regular passenger ships and on cargo vessels temporarily
15
adapted for troops—but without excruciating effort to get them all on board.
With the present port capacity of China’s southeastern coast, embarkation of
troops would be time-consuming. A choice would have to be made between
shuttling relatively small waves of troops to the beach and forcing early-loading
ships to hover offshore, vulnerable to attack, while the remaining vessels queue
up for pier space. Despite frenzied port construction over the last decade or so,
the ports from Shanghai to Hong Kong could accommodate sufficient shipping
to load only about two hundred thousand troops at any one time. This is only
16
10–13 percent of the possible force. Still, upgrading port capacity—like building airfields—would not exceed China’s competence, if it were willing to reallocate resources and postpone civilian-sector endeavors.
The difficult part of transporting troops, once successfully embarked, to their
objectives would be transferring them from large ships to small vessels able to
run aground close enough to the shore to disembark personnel in shallow water.
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Peng Hu
Islands

Most “China hands” agree that
China has in excess of a hundred
thousand small seagoing fishing
vessels. If each one carried thirty
troops—a conservative assumption—the last few tens of miles,
only half of them would be re17
quired to land 1.5 million troops.
U.S. amphibious doctrine puts
a great deal of emphasis on the organization of the ship-to-shore
movement of the assault landing
force. The Chinese would experience great difficulty in this respect, using civilian craft, and so
many of them. Amphibious doctrine calls for meticulous “reverse
embarkation,” or “combat loading,” of transports—loading last
everything that will be needed
first, so that it will be readily accessible in the holds; keeping all
boats carrying particular ground
units near each other; and forming painstakingly sequenced
“boat g roups” w ithin “boat
waves,” making up still larger “flotillas.” The principal concern is to
preserve the tactical organization
of army units. Without this coherence, landed in isolated, intermixed groups, the troops would
become a mob, ripe for slaughter.
A modern innovation in navigation might help the Chinese
orchestrate the tens of thousands
of small boats: Global Positioning
System receivers could help each
18
craft find its exact destination.
Soldiers could, therefore, be
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reasonably certain of joining their
larger units in a short time. Employing this technology could
make the Chinese doctrinal inno19
vators in amphibious warfare.
Whatever new technology the
Chinese may adopt, however, the
operational key is the enormous
“lift” potential of their commercial fleets. This capacity has too
frequently been written off, and
its omission unrealistically diminishes China’s ability to realize
its numerical advantage on Taiwan’s doorstep.
Beach Landing and Assault
Normally, in frontal attacks the
defenders have the upper hand.
However, in the amphibious situation, certain advantages accrue
to the offensive. It has the initiative; the landing force commander
chooses the time of attack and,
with the inherent flexibility of
movement upon the open sea, the
exact location. In this case, Taiwan would surely know that the
Chinese were coming, but not
precisely when or where; the attacker would have, almost automatically, the advantage of tactical
surprise.
The Taiwanese have nearly two
million people in their armed
forces, including reserves, which at
first glance makes the two sides
seem equal. However, uncertainty
would compel Taiwan to spread its
force over the 250-mile coastline
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opposite China. Its surveillance and warning system would likely be degraded, if
not saturated, by the vast number of contacts in a strait clogged with vessels. The
Chinese presumably would deliberately overload Taiwan’s surveillance sensors
rather than try to evade them.
Furthermore, even if somehow Taiwan managed to evacuate and bring home
all five divisions presently stationed on offshore islands, its twenty-one divisions
(including marines and seven divisions of reserves, but excluding two divisions
of armor and mechanized forces) would have to defend frontages of almost
thirteen miles each. That would be a considerable challenge: in June 1944 the
German forces holding the Normandy beaches, with frontages of less than ten
miles per division, lost the beachhead to a hundred thousand Allied troops in
under forty-eight hours.
With the at least theoretical capability of moving almost two million soldiers
in one “lift,” the Chinese would probably be able to mass sufficient infantry
somewhere to overwhelm the defenders. Once ashore, the sheer size of China’s
total force, given air and sea superiority, would make it difficult for the Taiwanese to counterattack effectively. It is unlikely they could entirely eliminate a
beachhead—even with their qualitatively superior armored forces. To recall
Normandy again, the German army’s inability to move armor against the beaches
because of Allied air superiority teaches an important lesson.
Nonetheless, the Chinese would find the number of tasks in a final assault,
and the complexity of integrating them, daunting. In particular, they would
have to sustain air superiority over an extended period. Moreover, the commander ashore would have to organize an airmobile theater reserve, a force
combining parachute and heliborne units. Just to get ashore, the landing force
commanders would have to improvise extensively to deal with the inhospitable
Taiwanese west coast, which is mostly mud flats, with significant tidal ranges.
The Chinese would also have to contend with two monsoon seasons, from August to September and from November to April; it would be restricted to two
“windows” of attack, from May to July and the month of October. Still, such impediments did not thwart U.S. amphibious forces at Inchon during the Korean
War; nor did coral reefs and an extremely low tide prevent the seizure of Tarawa
in World War II.
LIKELIHOOD OF AN INVASION
No prudent military planner can dismiss the possibility of a successful invasion
of Taiwan. The numerical advantages of the Chinese in almost every relevant
military category are unambiguous and overwhelming. Although it might be
years before any Chinese soldier sets foot on Taiwan itself, the early stages of a
phased offensive could begin earlier than expected—that is, long before the year
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2005, widely described as the soonest that China could project force beyond
its borders.
There are, of course, a number of big “ifs.” If the Chinese air force failed to
gain air superiority, or if the navy could not get millions of troops afloat, an attack would halt even before embarkation. Well before any attempt, if China did
not expand its airfield capacity near the coast facing Taiwan, it could not even
contemplate air superiority; similarly, if China had not significantly expanded
its port capacity in the same region, it could not use effectively the sea lift to be
requisitioned from the merchant marine. Sea control would be contingent on
the submarine force’s ability to sweep and hold a security corridor from shore to
shore; if that corridor were breached, the assault forces would most likely be destroyed en route. If, having crossed, the assault waves could not maintain coherence among the great mass of men and materiel, the defenders would prevail.
However, a determined government in Beijing may be able to overcome these
obstacles; it would need neither technological magic, super-weapons, spectacular leaps in weapons production, nor even a foreign benefactor. It would need a
wrenching reallocation of resources. A nation’s willingness to make great sacrifices cannot be assumed, but a sound military analysis cannot ignore the possibility. Underestimating the determination of seemingly overmatched Asian
powers has been a common American failing since 1950.
Another if is the delicate cross-strait military balance. Any dramatic tilt toward Taiwan’s favor in the rough military equivalence—all factors considered—that currently exists could limit Chinese offensives to Quemoy and other
small islands near the mainland. The new arms sales requisite for such a shift
would hardly dismay the Pentagon. However, Sino-American relations would
surely suffer, and as some analysts have pointed out, such an increase in arms
shipments could backfire, precipitating a preemptive strike before Taiwan had
time to assimilate the new equipment. The authorities in Taipei, in any case,
might choose to produce indigenously, or procure from other nations, whatever
arms could protect them from a cross-strait invasion.
The negative “ifs,” however, are balanced by a number of important “coulds.”
The People’s Liberation Army could commandeer an enormous range of civilian
assets that would contribute directly to its capabilities. China could transport
millions of personnel across the strait, choked with fifteen hundred ships and
tens of thousands of small vessels. Its air force could deliver ordnance with over
three thousand jet aircraft (though not in a single wave). A landing force could
overwhelm or outlast the Taiwanese army once it was firmly ashore.
Most significantly, the Chinese could phase an invasion over time to gain operational advantages, maneuvering successively against Taiwan’s untenable offshore islands. Such a multistaged campaign would maximize China’s inherent
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capacity to sustain a war of attrition, and it might well produce in effect a defeat
in detail, should Taiwan defend each position. Even if Taiwan chose not to fight
for every foot of ground, the advantages of an extended time frame would seem
to accrue to China.
The world will not know which camp of contending analysts will win this
debate unless China actually attacks Taiwan. We are confident that those who
continue to ignore the significance of airfields, submarines, commercial sea lift,
and sequential campaigning will not have prepared the nation for the worst-case
contingency.
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